We study the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel, which consists of a transmitter, a legitimate user, and an eavesdropper. In this channel, the transmitter sends a common message to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. In addition to this common message, the legitimate user receives a private message, which is desired to be kept hidden as much as possible from the eavesdropper. We obtain the entire capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel. This region contains all achievable common message, private message, and private message's equivocation (secrecy) rates. In particular, we show the sufficiency of jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input to evaluate the existing single-letter description of the capacity-equivocation region due to Csiszar-Korner.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E consider the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel, which consists of a transmitter, a legitimate user, and an eavesdropper. In this channel, the transmitter sends a common message to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper in addition to a private message which is directed to only the legitimate user. There is a secrecy concern regarding this private message in the sense that the private message needs to be kept secret as much as possible from the eavesdropper. The secrecy of the private message is measured by its equivocation at the eavesdropper.
Here, we obtain the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel. This region contains all achievable rate triples , where denotes the common message rate, denotes the private message rate, and denotes the private message's equivocation (secrecy) rate. In fact, this region is known in a single-letter form due to [1] . In this paper, we show that jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input are sufficient to evaluate this single-letter description for the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel. We prove the sufficiency of the jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input by using channel enhancement [2] and an extremal inequality from [3] . In our proof, we also use the equivalence between the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel and the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages [4, , [5] . In the latter channel model, the transmitter has three messages, a common, a confidential, and a public message. The common message is sent to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, while the confidential and public messages are directed to only the legitimate user. Here, the confidential message needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy, whereas there is no secrecy constraint on the public message. Since the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel and the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages are equivalent, i.e., there is a one-to-one correspondence between the capacity regions of these two models, in our proof, we obtain the capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages, which, in turn, gives us the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel.
Our result subsumes the following previous findings about the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel: 1) The secrecy capacity of this channel, i.e., when , is obtained in [6] and [7] for the general case, and in [8] for the 2-2-1 case. 2) The common and confidential rate region under perfect secrecy, i.e., region with , is obtained in [9] .
3) The capacity-equivocation region without a common message, i.e., region with , is obtained in [5] . 4) The capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel with degraded message sets without a secrecy concern, i.e., region with no consideration on , is obtained in [10] . Here, we obtain the entire region. Our result as well as the previous results listed above hold when there is a covariance constraint on the channel input as well as when there is a total power constraint on the channel input.
II. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS WIRETAP CHANNELS
The discrete memoryless wiretap channel consists of a transmitter, a legitimate user, and an eavesdropper. The channel transition probability is denoted by , where is the channel input, is the legitimate user's observation, and is the eavesdropper's observation. We consider the following scenario for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel: the transmitter sends a common message to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, and a private message to the legitimate user which is desired to be kept hidden as much as possible from the eavesdropper.
An code for this channel consists of two message sets , , one encoder at the transmitter , one decoder at the legitimate user , and one decoder at the eavesdropper . The probability of error is defined as , where , and is a uniformly 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE distributed random variable in . We note that corresponds to the common message that is transmitted to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, and denotes the private message sent only to the legitimate user, on which there is a secrecy constraint. The secrecy of the legitimate user's private message is measured by its equivocation at the eavesdropper [1] , [11] , i.e.,
A rate triple is said to be achievable if there exists an code such that , and
The capacity-equivocation region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel is defined as the convex closure of all achievable rate triples , and denoted by . The capacity-equivocation region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel, which is obtained in [1] , is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([1, Theorem 1]): The capacity-equivocation region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel is given by the union of rate triples satisfying
for some such that (7) We next provide an alternative description for . This alternative description will arise as the capacity region of a different, however related, communication scenario for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel. In this communication scenario, the transmitter has three messages, , where is the common message sent to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, is the public message sent only to the legitimate user on which there is no secrecy constraint, and is the confidential message sent only to the legitimate user in perfect secrecy. In this scenario, since needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy, it needs to satisfy the following condition:
As we noted before, unlike , there is no secrecy constraint on the public message . We also note that the perfect secrecy on a message is attained when the equivocation of this message is equal to its rate, i.e., when we have , which can be seen by comparing (2) and (8) . To distinguish this communication scenario from the previous one, we call the channel model arising from this scenario the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with public messages. We note that this alternative description for wiretap channels has been previously considered in [4, Problem33-c], [5] .
An code for this scenario consists of three message sets , one encoder at the transmitter , one decoder at the legitimate user , and one decoder at the eavesdropper . The probability of error is defined as , where and . A rate triple is said to be achievable if there exists an code such that and (8) is satisfied. The capacity region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with public messages is defined as the convex closure of all achievable rate triples . The following lemma establishes the equivalence between and .
Lemma 1: iff . The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix I. This proof consists of two steps. In the first step, we note that if , then in the corresponding achievable scheme attaining this rate triple, we can combine the messages to obtain , whose equivocation will be as least due to the perfect secrecy requirement on . Hence, this argument proves the inclusion . In the second step, we show the reverse inclusion . To this end, we consider the achievable scheme that attains the entire region , and call this achievable scheme the optimal achievable scheme. If the rate triple , in the corresponding optimal achievable scheme, the private message can be divided into two parts where the rate of is sufficiently close to and satisfies the perfect secrecy requirement. Hence, this argument shows that , i.e., ; completing the proof of Lemma 1. Using Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we can express as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The capacity region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with public messages is given by the union of rate triples satisfying
for some such that
III. GAUSSIAN MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
The Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is defined by
where the channel input is a vector, is an column vector denoting the legitimate user's observation, is an column vector denoting the eavesdropper's observation, are the channel gain matrices of sizes , respectively, and are Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , 1 respectively, which are assumed to be strictly positive-definite, i.e., . We consider a covariance constraint on the channel input as follows: (15) where . The capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is denoted by which contains all achievable rate triples . The main result of this paper is the characterization of the capacity-equivocation region as stated in the following theorem. Theorem 3: The capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is given by the union of rate triples satisfying
for some positive semidefinite matrix such that . Similar to what we did in the previous section, we can establish an alternative statement for Theorem 3 by considering the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages, where the legitimate user's private message is divided into two parts such that one part (confidential message) needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy and there is no secrecy constraint on the other part (public message). The capacity region for this alternative scenario is denoted by . We note that Lemma 1 provides a one-to-one connection between the capacity regions and , and this equivalence can be extended to the capacity regions and by incorporating the covariance constraint on the channel input in the proof of Lemma 1. Thus, using Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, can be obtained as follows. Theorem 4: The capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages is given by the union of rate triples satisfying
(21) 1 Without loss of generality, we can set . However, we let be arbitrary for ease of presentation.
for some positive semidefinite matrix such that . We next define a subclass of Gaussian MIMO wiretap channels called the aligned Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, which can be obtained from (13) In this study, we first prove Theorems 3 and 4 for the aligned Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel. Then, we establish the capacity region for the general channel model in (13)-(14) by following the analysis in [2, Sec. V.B] and [12, Sec. 7.1] in conjunction with the capacity result we obtain for the aligned channel.
A. Capacity Region Under a Power Constraint
We note that the covariance constraint on the channel input in (15) is a rather general constraint that subsumes the average power constraint (24) as a special case, see Lemma 1 and [2, Corollary 1]. Therefore, using Theorem 3, the capacity-equivocation region arising from the average power constraint in (24), , can be found as follows.
Corollary 1: The capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel subject to an average power constraint , , is given by the union of rate triples satisfying
for some positive semidefinite matrices such that .
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 FOR THE ALIGNED CASE
Instead of proving Theorem 3, here we prove Theorem 4, which implies Theorem 3 due to Lemma 1. Achievability of the region given in Theorem 4 can be shown by setting in Theorem 2, and using jointly Gaussian , where are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively. In the rest of this section, we provide the converse proof. To this end, we note that since 2 is convex by definition, it can be characterized by solving the following optimization problem: 3 (29) for all , and all possible common message rates , which is bounded as follows:
where are the single-user capacities for the legitimate user and the eavesdropper channels, respectively, i.e.,
We note that the optimization problem in (29) can be expressed in the following more explicit form:
We also consider the Gaussian rate region which is defined by (35) at the bottom of the page, where are given as follows:
(38) (39) 2 Although is originally defined for the general, not necessarily aligned, Gaussian wiretap channel with public messages, here we use to denote the capacity region of the aligned Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with public messages as well. 3 Although characterizing by solving the following optimization problem:
(28) for all seems to be more natural, we find working with (29) more convenient. Here, we characterize by solving (29) for all for all fixed feasible .
To provide the converse proof, i.e., to prove the optimality of jointly Gaussian for the optimization problem in (33)-(34), we will show that (40) where is defined as
We show (40) in two parts: 1) 2) .
A.
In this case, can be written as
where we use the fact that , and the secret message rate can be given up in favor of the private message rate . In other words, we use the fact that when , the maximum of is given by , where is an achievable public message rate since the secret message can be converted into a public message. This optimization problem gives us the capacity region of the two-user Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel with degraded message sets, where a common message is sent to both users, and a private message, on which there is no secrecy constraint, is sent to one of the two users [13] . The optimization problem for this case given in (42)-(43) is solved in [10] by showing the optimality of jointly Gaussian , i.e., . This completes the converse proof for the case .
B.
In this case, we first study the optimization problem in (41). We rewrite as follows:
where we use the fact that since , the secret message rate should be set as high as possible to maximize , i.e., we should set . Let be the maximizer for this optimization problem. The necessary
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions that needs to satisfy are given in the following lemma. 
and for some such that it satisfies and (49) and are given as follows:
(50) needs to satisfy (51)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix II. We treat three cases separately: 1) ; 2)
; 3)
.
1)
: In this case, we have , see (50). Thus, the KKT condition in (46) reduces to (52)
We first note that satisfying (52) achieves the secrecy capacity of this Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel [14] , i.e.,
Next, we define a new covariance matrix as follows:
(56) which is similar to the channel enhancement done in [14] . This new covariance matrix has some useful properties which are listed in the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix III.
Lemma 3: We have the following facts: 1) ; 2) ; where satisfies (52). Using (62) in (51), we find as follows:
(63)
We also note the following:
Now, we show that (67)
To this end, we assume that
which implies that there exists a rate triple such that
To prove (67), i.e., that (68) is not possible, we note the following bounds:
where (70) comes from (55) and the fact that the rate of the confidential message, i.e., , cannot exceed the secrecy capacity, and (71) is due to (66) and the fact that the sum rate cannot exceed the legitimate user's single-user capacity. Thus, in view of , we can multiply (70) and (71) by and , respectively, and add the corresponding inequalities to obtain (72) which contradicts with (69), proving (67). This completes the converse proof for this case.
Before starting the proofs of the other two cases, we now recap our proof for the case . We note that we did not show the optimality of Gaussian signalling directly, instead, we prove it indirectly by showing the following:
(73) First, we show that for the given common message rate , we can achieve the secrecy capacity, i.e., , see (53)-(55). In other words, we show that is on the boundary of the capacity region . Secondly, we show that for the given common message rate , achieve the sum capacity of the public and confidential messages, i.e., is sum rate optimal for the given common message rate [see (64)-(66) and (71)]. These two findings lead to the inequalities in (70)-(71). Finally, we use a time-sharing argument for these two inequalities in (70)-(71) to obtain (73), which completes the proof.
2) : We first rewrite the KKT condition in (46) as follows:
(74) by defining , , and . We note that if , we have , if , we have . The proof of these two cases are very similar, and we consider only the case , i.e., we assume . The other case can be proved similarly. Similar to Section IV-B1, here also, we prove the desired identity (75) by contradiction. We first assume that (76) which implies that there exists a rate triple such that
where we define . Since the sum rate needs to be smaller than the legitimate user's single user capacity, we have
On the other hand, we have the following:
where (79) comes from (51), and (80) is due to our assumption that . Equations (78) and (81) imply that (82)
In the rest of this section, we prove that we have for the given common message rate , which, in conjunction with (82), will yield a contradiction with (77); proving (75). To this end, we first define a new covariance matrix as follows:
(83) This new covariance matrix has some useful properties which are listed in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: We have the following facts: 1) ; 2)
; 3) ; 4)
. The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix IV. Using this new covariance matrix, we define a random vector as (84) where is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix . Due to the first and second statements of Lemma 4, we have the following Markov chains:
We next study the following optimization problem:
where the equality follows from the fact that the maximum of is obtained by selecting both and to be individually maximum, i.e., by setting , , since this is possible by simply setting . Since we assume , we have the following lower bound for (87):
(88) Now we solve the optimization problem in (87) as follows: which contradicts with (77), proving (75). This completes the converse proof for this case. Before providing the proof for the last case, we recap our proof for the case . Similar to Section IV-B1, here also, we prove the optimality of Gaussian signalling indirectly, i.e., we show the desired identity (101) indirectly. First, we show that for the given common message rate , is sum rate optimal, i.e., achieve the sum capacity of the public and confidential messages, by obtaining (82). Second, we show that is also on the boundary of the capacity region by obtaining (98). These two findings give us the inequalities in (82) and (99). Finally, we use a time-sharing argument for these two inequalities in (82) and (99) to establish (101), which completes the proof.
3) : In this case, we have , see (49)-(50). Hence, the KKT condition in (46) reduces to (102) We again prove the desired identity (103) by contradiction. We first assume that (104) which implies that there exists a rate triple such that (105)
In the rest of the section, we show that (106) to reach a contradiction, and hence, prove (103). To this end, we define a new covariance matrix as follows:
This new covariance matrix has some useful properties listed in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: We have the following facts. 1) ; 2) ; 3) ; 4)
. The proof of this lemma is very similar to the proof Lemma 4, and hence is omitted. Using this new covariance matrix , we define a random vector as (108) where is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix . Due to the first and second statements of Lemma 5, we have the following Markov chains:
Next, we study the following optimization problem:
We note that since , we have the following lower bound for the optimization problem in (111):
We next obtain the maximum for (111). To this end, we introduce the following lemma which provides an explicit form for this optimization problem.
Lemma 6: For , we have (113)
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix V. Next we introduce the following extremal inequality from [3] , which will be used in the solution of (113). 
where (119) is due to , (120) is due to the Markov chain in (110), (121)-(122) come from the Markov chains in (109)-(109), respectively, (124) is due to the maximum entropy theorem [15] , (125) comes from (117), and (128) is due to the third part of Lemma 5. Comparing (130) and (112) yields (131) which contradicts with our assumption in (105); implying (103). This completes the converse proof for this case.
We note that contrary to Sections IV-B1 and IV-B2, here we prove the optimality of Gaussian signalling, i.e.,
directly. In other words, to show (132), we did not find any other points on the boundary of the capacity region and did not have to use a time-sharing argument between these points to reach (132). (This was our strategy in Sections IV-B1 and IV-B2.) Instead, we define a new optimization problem given in (113) whose solution yields (132).
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 FOR THE GENERAL CASE
The achievability of the region given in Theorem 3 can be shown by computing the region in Theorem 1 with the following selection of : , where are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively, . In the rest of this section, we consider the converse proof. We first note that following the approaches in [2, Sec. V.B] and [12, Sec. 7.1] , it can be shown that a new Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel can be constructed from any Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel described by (13)- (14) such that the new channel has the same capacity-equivocation region with the original one and in the new channel, both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper have the same number of antennas as the transmitter, i.e., . Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that . We next apply singular-value decomposition to the channel gain matrices as follows: for some positive semidefinite matrix . We next obtain an outer bound for the capacity-equivocation region of the original Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in (13)- (14) in terms of . To this end, we first note the following Markov chains:
(144) (145) which imply that if the messages with rates are transmitted with a vanishingly small probability of error in the original Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel given by (13)- (14) , they will be transmitted with a vanishingly small probability of error in the new Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel given by (135)-(136) as well. However, as opposed to the rates , we cannot immediately conclude that if an equivocation rate is achievable in the original Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel given in (13)- (14) , it is also achievable in the new Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in (135)-(136). The reason for this is that both the legitimate user's and the eavesdropper's channel gain matrices are enhanced in the new channel given by (135)-(136) [see (137)-(138) and/or (144)-(145)], and consequently, it is not clear what the overall effect of these two enhancements on the equivocation rate will be. However, in the sequel, we show that if , then we have . This will let us write down an outer bound for in terms of . To this end, we note that if , we need to have a random vector such that the inequalities given in Theorem 1 hold. Assume that we use the same random vector for the new Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in (135) where we use the fact that (151) which follows from the continuity of in positive semidefinite matrices, and the fact that . Finally, we note that (152) converges to the region given in Theorem 3 due to the continuity of in positive semidefinite matrices and ; completing the proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
We study the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel in which a common message is sent to both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper in addition to the private message sent only to the legitimate user. We first establish an equivalence between this original definition of the wiretap channel and the wiretap channel with public messages, in which the private message is divided into two parts as the confidential message, which needs to be transmitted in perfect secrecy, and public message, on which there is no secrecy constraint. We next obtain capacity regions for both cases. We show that it is sufficient to consider jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and channel input to evaluate the single-letter description of the capacity-equivocation region due to [1] . We prove this by using channel enhancement [2] and an extremal inequality from [3] .
APPENDIX I PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof of this lemma for is outlined in [4, Problem 33-c], [5] . We extend their proof to the general case of interest here. We first note the inclusion , which follows from the fact that if , we can attain the rate triple , i.e., . To show the reverse inclusion, we use the achievability proof for Theorem 1 given in [1] . According to this achievable scheme, can be divided into two parts as with rates , respectively, and we have (153)
for some which satisfies . Hence, using this capacity achieving scheme for , we can attain the rate triple . This implies ; completing the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since the program in (44)-(45) is not necessarily convex, the KKT conditions are necessary but not sufficient. The Lagrangian for this optimization problem is given by (156) where are positive semidefinite matrices, and , . The necessary KKT conditions that they need to satisfy are given as follows: Using the fact that for , , if , then in (186) yields the third statement of the lemma. To prove the first statement of the lemma, we note that (183) implies (187) which is already shown to be positive semidefinite as done through (169)-(176) in Appendix III.
Finally, we consider the fourth statement of this lemma as follows: 
